update at 28 May 2015
|Division||Department of Comparative Contemporary Politics|
|Research fields||Political Economy|
|firstname.lastname@example.org||C.V.||Nobuhiro Hiwatari(May 2013) [PDF]|
Teaching and Research Appointments
|1993 − 1998||Associate Professor, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo|
|1994 − 1996||Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley|
|1994 − 1996||Overseas Fellow, St. John’s College, Cambridge University|
|1996 − 1997||Visiting Scholar, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University|
|1998 −||Professor, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo|
|1998 − 1999||Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science Columbia University|
|2005 − 2006||Visiting Scholar, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University|
|2009 − 2010||Visiting Scholar, MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies, Yale University|
English Academic Publications
(1)Monographs and Edited Volumes
- Inside Japan's Leviathan: Decision Making in the Government Bureaucracy, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California Berkeley, 1988 (co-authored with Brian Woodall)
- Social Contracts Under Stress: The Middle Classes of America, Europe, and Japan at the Turn of the Century (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), co-edited with Olivier Zunz and Leonard Schoppa
(2)Book Chapters and Articles
- “Explaining the End of the Postwar Party System,” in Junji Banno (ed.), The Political Economy of Japanese Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)
- “Adjustment to Stagflation and Neoliberal Reform in Japan, the UK, and the US,” Comparative Political Studies, 31-5 (1998), pp. 602-632.
- “Japanese Corporate Governance Reexamined,” in Margaret Blair & Mark Roe (eds.), Employees and Corporate Governance (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1999), pp. 275-313
- “The Reorganization of Japan's Financial Bureaucracy: The politics of bureaucratic structure and blame avoidance,” in Takeo Hoshi & Hugh Patrick (eds.), Crisis and Change in the Japanese Financial System (New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 109-136
- “Disinflationary Adjustment: The link between economic globalization and challenges to Postwar social contracts,” in Olivier Zunz, Leonard Schoppa, and Nobuhiro Hiwatari (eds.), Social Contracts Under Stress: The Middle Classes of America, Europe, and Japan at the Turn of the Century (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), pp. 281-318.
- “Embedded Policy Preferences and the Formation of International Arrangement after the Asian Financial Crisis,” The Pacific Review, 16-3 (2003), pp.331-359.
- “The Problem of Macroeconomic Policy Crossroads: Explaining the economic policy paradox of Switzerland and Japan in the 1990s,” The Swiss Political Science Review, 10-3 (2004), 137-178.
- “Structural Reforms at OECD Countries: The international monetary and domestic legislative causes of policy similarity.” Journal of Social Sciences 62 (1) (2010): 25-50.
- “Political Regimes and Adjustments to the Global Economy” Journal of Social Sciences 63 (3・4): 5-22.
Topics of research
- (1)Economic Interdependence and Political Rivalry: Political survival and regional cooperation
- This project explains how binding international economic agreements are more likely to spread among likeminded poliitcal regimes, particularly among democracies. Based on the expectation that democracies and non-democracies differ in the extent the leaders can tolarate financial market movements providing vital information about their economic policy competence, this paper shows that trade and financial agreements are likley to be promoted by democartic leaders who need to ensure the fruits of their economic liberalization reforms.
- (2)Competence Matters: Global recessions and the new politics of market adjustment
- This project explores the democratic foundations of market-assuring reforms (fiscal and regulatory and labor market reforms) at OECD coutries from the mid-1970s to the Great Recsssion (2008-10). It has two major findings: (1) manistream political parties and the post-electoral political center move counter-cyclically, meaning rightwards at the onset of global recessions and leftwarda after economic recovery. (2) spending decisions and major regularty reforms reflect the positions of the political center. The two phenomena are explaned as a result of competing mainstream party leaders trying to convince voters of their economic competence by promulgting responsible and effective market assuring policies during elections("policy straight-talk") and implmenting them through compromise ("cross-partisanship"). Given the constraints of capital mobility our argument suggests that the new politics of market adjustment does fulfill the minimun requirements of democratic accountability.