

Reading List: Oligopoly Theory

2. Quantity-Setting Competition

- (2-1) Tirole, J. (1988), *The Theory of Industrial Organization*, Ch. 5. MIT Press.
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3. Price-Setting Competition and Contestable Markets

3.1 General Discussion

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3.2 Price-Setting vs Quantity-Setting

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6. Endogenous Timing in Oligopoly

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7. Multi-stage Strategic Commitment Games

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8. Product Differentiation and Spatial Competition

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