

# **The rise of ‘new social classes’ within the service class in the Netherlands**

Political orientation of the ‘new social classes’ between 1970-2000

A. Güveli

A. Need

N. D. de Graaf

Ayşe Güveli  
University of Nijmegen  
ICS / Sociology  
P.O. Box 9104  
6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands  
Phone: + 31 24 361 2013 / fax + 31 24 361 2399  
E-mail: [A.Guveli@maw.kun.nl](mailto:A.Guveli@maw.kun.nl)

## **Abstract**

The Dutch industrial employment structure is transforming into a post-industrial employment structure. Existing social class schemas, like the well-known EGP class-schema, were constructed for the industrial employment structure. We adjusted the service class of the EGP class-schema for post-industrial employment structure using ‘new class’ theories and studies about the post-industrial class structure. Our research question is to what extent the adjusted EGP class-schema will explain people’s political orientation more accurately than the standard EGP class-schema in the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial employment structure. The first hypothesis states that the distinguished ‘new social classes’ in the EGP class-schema are different in their political orientation than the ‘old social classes’ in service class. The second hypothesis is that, in their formation process, the ‘new social classes’ will become more effective to explain the differences (effect size) in people’s political orientation. We used Dutch data gathered in a period of 30 years between 1970 and 2000 in 18 different surveys with a total of 32.700 respondents. The adjusted EGP class-schema appeared to be substantially better in explaining people’s political orientation than the standard EGP class-schema: the ‘new social classes’ are substantially different in their political orientation than the ‘old social classes’. Furthermore, the political orientation of *the low-grade social and cultural specialists* has become more crystallized from 1970 onwards.

## 1. Introduction

The Netherlands, the country we will focus on in this paper, experienced vast changes in the employment structure and in the social class structure. The Netherlands is in this respect not an exception. Research shows the composition of employment shifts from an industrial employment structure to a post-industrial employment structure (Asselberghs et al., 1998). There has been a substantial switch in employment from agriculture and industry to the service sector since 1960. Between 1960 and 1994 the share of industrial employment decreased from 33 per cent to 18 per cent, while the employment rates of the commercial service sector increased from 21 per cent to 30 per cent, and the rates in other service sectors increased from 19 per cent to 34 per cent.

According to figures of Ganzeboom and Luijkx (2002), as shown in Table 1, the Dutch class structure has considerably changed between 1970 and 1999. For instance the service class (classes I and II) increased from 30 per cent in 1970 to 51 per cent in 1999, which implies that today the majority of the employed population belongs to the service class. On the other hand, the classes of semi- and unskilled workers, self-employed farmers and of agricultural workers (classes VIIa, IVc and VIIIb) decreased from 25 per cent in 1970 to 13 per cent in 1999, mainly due to processes such as mechanization and computerization.

*[Table 1 about here]*

Despite changes in employment structure and changes in the size of social classes, sociologists still use class schemas such as the well-known EGP class-schema of Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979). The EGP class-schema is based on occupations and on

the employment relations of industrial employment structure. The question is whether this EGP class-schema reflects important social cleavages. In order to be able to answer this question, one needs an indication for these cleavages. Traditionally, voting behaviour has been used to examine these cleavages.

In political science and in sociology, the voting behaviour of the classes has been studied extensively (Nieuwbeerta, 1995). This research shows that variations within the service class in voting behaviour are more marked than variations between the classes (De Graaf and Steijn, 1997; Butler and Savage, 1995). This suggests that the EGP class-schema needs to be adjusted. Another reason to adjust the EGP class-schema is the changes in the employment structure. For these reasons we will adjust the service class of the EGP class-schema on basis of the literature on post-industrial class theories and studies that already have adjusted the EGP class-schema. Hence, we will only adjust the service class of the EGP class-schema and we will not change other social classes of this schema. Furthermore, we will test the validity of the adjusted EGP class-schema by comparing it with the standard EGP class-schema. If the adjusted EGP class-schema is better to reflect the social cleavages in post-industrial societies, it will predict people's political orientation better than the EGP class-schema. The first research question is then as follows:

*To what extent does the adjusted EGP class-schema predict people's political orientation better than the standard EGP class-schema?*

To give a convincing answer to this question, we will analyse people's political orientation from different classes during the last decades in the Netherlands. According to class formation theory, it takes time for a class to get a high degree of demographic identity (Goldthorpe,

2000). Thus, if there are ‘new’ classes within the service class, these classes have to become more effective to explain the differences in political orientation over time. The second research question is:

*To what extent do the distinguished new social classes become more effective to explain the differences (effect size) in people’s political orientation over time?*

## **2. Theory**

### **2.1 Are social classes ‘dying’ or are new social classes arising?**

The importance of social class has been a subject of many debates. Lipset (1981 [1960]) shows the significance of social classes on voting behaviour in his classical work *Political Man*. Some argue that social classes are “dying” (Clark and Lipset, 1991) while others claim that new social classes are arising (Kriesi, 1989; De Graaf and Steijn, 1997). Three decades after the publication of *Political Man*, Clark et al. (1991, 1993) use the Alford index (Alford, 1962) in their analysis and come to conclusion that social class has lost its importance in explaining the political behaviour in contemporary western societies. Some criticize (Evans, 2000; Manza and Brooks, 1996, 1999; Nieuwebeerta, 1995) the Alford index to be a simplistic measure to represent class based voting and to capture the decline in class based voting.<sup>1</sup> Brooks and Manza (1997) developed more sophisticated measurement methods and distinguish six social classes to analyse the importance of social classes on voting behaviour. They show that social class has not lost its importance in explaining voting behaviour since

1960 in U.S. However, using the EGP class-schema that contains seven different social classes, Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf (1999) show also a decline in class voting in the post-war period in western societies.

The debate on whether the social classes represent important cleavages in affluent western societies has got another turn with Inglehart's theses (1990, 1997). Inglehart asserts that social classes have lost their significance in affluent western societies due to the fact that they were engendered by income inequalities. The financial concerns seem less pressing in contemporary affluent societies. Hence, the social cleavages in affluent societies are salient between people with different value priorities like materialists versus post-materialists. The post-materialists are a relatively new group that are high-educated (Inglehart, 1990) and are prevalent in the higher social strata. While Inglehart does not label this group as a social class, in our view, this relatively new group in the higher strata forms to some extent, a separate social class within the service class. We will elaborate on this idea further below.

## **2.2 A new social class within the service class**

While on the one hand, discussions on the significance of social class in temporary western societies are still going on, there are attempts to delineate the emergence of new social classes within the service class. One of this attempts is the 'new class theory' (Bruce-Briggs, 1979; Brint, 1984; Lamont, 1987; Kriesi, 1989; Esping-Andersen, 1993). According to 'new class theory', the middle class can be divided into two classes; a 'new class' of 'knowledge workers' and an 'old class' of industrials and business owners. Bruce-Briggs (1979) claims that there is a struggle between these two classes for the power and status in society. There are

different views of how to conceptualise the 'new classes'. Brint (1984) uses several conceptualisations of the 'new classes' in his work and concludes that differences within the service class can be explained by educational differences. In contrast, Lamont (1987) claims that there are progressive attitudes by the incumbents of cultural capital workers. Their common interests can explain these attitudes. According to Lamont (1987), this common interest of the cultural capital workers is to maintain and increase their autonomy, to have a powerful governmental sector, to promote taxes from the private sector, and to support political attitudes that are about 'non'-material issues, like post-materialism, environmentalism and the new left.

In accordance with Lamont, Kriesi (1989) builds on the 'new class' concept, which he uses to explain support for 'new social movements'<sup>2</sup> in the Netherlands. In his middle class conceptualisation, Kriesi distinguishes two main classes i.e. technocrats and specialists. Kriesi (1989) argues that there is 'a basic antagonism of interest' between technocrats and specialists. Technocrats are supposed to preserve the integrity of the organisation they work for, whilst the professional specialists are more client-oriented or their objective is to handle with the body of knowledge of the disciplines they belong to. The specialists are supposed to represent the 'new class' and they are likely to support the new social movements because 'the specialist try to defend their own and their clients' relative autonomy' against the interventions of the controllers (Kriesi, 1989, 1085-86).

Additionally, we discuss two more theories that can shed light on the class structure of post-industrial society. One is the materialism and post-materialism thesis of Inglehart (1990) about the value shift in affluent societies. The value priorities of materialists and post-materialists are based on their needs. Materialists focus on materialistic goods whereas post-

materialists have more interest in quality of life issues. Both choose their type of education and occupation on grounds of their needs and priorities. Members of occupations in the service class correspond to these two dimensions of materialists and post-materialists. It is obvious that materialists will not choose occupations in which they cannot satisfy their materialistic needs while people who already satisfied their materialistic needs, are more likely to choose occupations in which the needs of quality of life issues and the aesthetic desires will be realized. In our view, materialists are more found among managerial and technocratic occupations like managers and administrators while post-materialists are more among social and cultural occupations.

These two value dimensions that Inglehart discusses have a resemblance with the distinction between *economical* and *cultural* elites made by Bourdieu (1984) (De Graaf and De Graaf, 1988). All kinds of lifestyle forms, like culture participation, consumption patterns, aesthetic priorities and political attitudes can be thought of as the social codes of social groups. Members of social groups use their *cultural* or *economic* capital to exclude outsiders from their privileged circumstances to preserve the status of their group. Bourdieu makes use of occupational positions to differentiate the economical or cultural status of a person. He uses two different occupational ladders for these two dimensions. Occupations with a low social status, like the unskilled workers, have a low score on both ladders while cultural and economic features of an occupation are attendant among the occupations in the middle and higher strata. Occupations in education, health service and in social services are occupations with a high score on cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984) and constitute the 'new class' of the post-industrial society (De Swaan, 1985). Occupations with a relatively high economical dimension are the occupations of 'old' middle class like economists, engineers, managers and proprietors.



### **2.3 EGP class-schema and the need of adjusting the service class**

Inspired by Marx and Weber, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) delineate the structure of social classes by employment relations<sup>3</sup>. The EGP class-schema aims to differentiate the positions in terms of *employment relations* that they entail. The starting-point of the division of social classes is threefold: the employers, self-employed workers and employees. Starting from this threefold hierarchical classification, Goldthorpe (2000) uses the employment contracts to construct a more detailed class schema.

Goldthorpe (2000) also makes a distinction between forms of regulation of employment, which are service relationships, labour contracts and a mix of these two. The service relationship occurs when ‘the degree of difficulty involved in monitoring the work performed by employees’ and the ‘degree of specificity of human assets or human capital used by employees in performing their work’ is high (Goldthorpe, 2000, 213-14). The service class, which represents the service relationship, contains the high-grade professionals (I) and the low-grade professionals (II) in the EGP class-schema. Class I contains occupations like scientists, medical experts, administrators and officials, managers in large industrial establishment and large proprietors. Class II contains occupations like nurses, teachers, administrators and officials, higher-grade technicians, managers in small business and industrial establishment, supervisors of non-manual employees. Goldthorpe (2000) puts professionals and managers in the same class according to the criteria of monitoring and specificity of human assets.

In our view, professionals and managers and administrators cannot be placed in the same class because it is clear for the managers and administrators how to carry out their tasks. It is not difficult to monitor the work performed by managers and administrator because, for example, the aim of managers is to make profit for their employer organization. If managers of organisations do not succeed in making profit, it is required that they resign or at least they will be placed in another function. In the case that the manager manages a non-profit organization, still it is obvious that the goal of a manager is to carry out the managerial tasks and maintain the viability and success of their organization. In contrast to managers, it is more difficult for an employer to monitor the tasks of professionals. This especially holds for the *social and cultural specialists*. For example, medical specialists and psychologists use highly specialized knowledge while performing their job. It is exactly this specialized knowledge that makes it difficult to measure the performance of social and cultural specialist by others. For this reason it is difficult for employers to monitor the results of employees of these occupations (Freidson, 1986).

Goldthorpe (1982, 1995) claims that the service class is still in formation and if it *consolidates*, it will become ‘an essentially conservative element within the society’, because members of the service class occupy the most privileged occupations within the social division of labour; thus they are unlikely to be proponents of egalitarian values or politics. More likely they will seek to preserve the *status quo*. This claim has been criticized and is not backed by research (Lamont, 1987; Kriesi, 1989; De Graaf and Steijn, 1997). However, Goldthorpe does not mention when this *consolidation* of service class will occur. Studies show that there are large differences in the political orientation within the service class (Brint, 1984; Kriesi, 1989; Savage, 1991; De Graaf and Steijn, 1997; Van der Werfhorst and De Graaf, forthcoming); it is obvious that the *consolidation* process of the service class is not

finished yet. In the study of Hout et al. (1995) in the U.S. between 1948 and 1992, the consolidation process of the service class seems to contradict Goldthorpe's (1995) predictions. Hout et al. (1995) show that professionals voted for Republican candidates from 1948 till 1960s and then shifted their votes to Democratic candidates while managers have been voting for the Republican candidates for the whole period between 1948 and 1992. These results suggest that members of different occupations within service class are becoming more and more different in their behaviour and attitude with regard to their political orientation.

Savage (1991) claims that managers have a more conservative view than professionals because they are *committed to* 'organizational assets' just like employers. The professionals could be more 'non-conservative', because they are more culturally oriented, have 'cultural assets', and perceive themselves as relatively independent from their employers or employing organization. Savage suggests a distinction between professionals and managers. But Goldthorpe's (1995) idea is that if we take education of professionals and managers in consideration, the voting behaviour of professionals, in Britain at least, does not significantly differ from managers. It is therefore important to test whether the educational differences of professionals and managers can explain the differences in voting behaviour of these classes.

#### **2.4 Adjusting the service class of the EGP class-schema**

De Graaf and Steijn (1997) claim that the EGP class-schema is not appropriate for the post-industrial societies. They show that there are large differences between their adjusted EGP class-schema and Goldthorpe's class-schema with regard to political behaviour of Dutch

people. De Graaf and Steijn (1997) divide the service class (class I and II of EGP class-schema) into four classes. They distinguish managers from social and cultural specialists. They argue that these classes have different labour market situations. Using the Dutch Family-survey (Ultee and Ganzeboom, 1995), they show that the adjusted EGP class-schema improves the explanation of the differences in a great amount of attitudes and behaviour even when controlling for education.

In this paper we build on this new classification of De Graaf and Steijn (1997) to adjust the EGP class-schema that already incorporated the theories of Kriesi (1989), Lamont (1987) and Esping-Andersen (1993). Additionally we use theories of Inglehart (1990) and Bourdieu (1984) to make clear that all these theories imply social cleavages in the middle class. Our main argumentation to divide these classes is derived from Goldthorpe's basic argument of employment relations and from the 'new class theory'. Relatively new is that we analyse the formation process of the 'new classes'. Put in other words, we analyse the differences between the 'new classes' and the 'old classes' over time with regard to people's political orientation.

We will reclassify the service class into *controllers* and *social and cultural specialists* according to following three criteria:

Our first criterion is *difficulty in monitoring the tasks performed by employees*. We claim that tasks performed by social and cultural specialists are more difficult to monitor than tasks performed by managers. The second criterion is *managerial versus social-cultural specialised knowledge based tasks*. To reclassify the service class, both of these two criteria have to be met. There are two groups of occupations in the service class: occupations with a *basic work*

task of social and cultural services and occupations without a *basic* work task of social and cultural services. If the *basic* task of the incumbents of an occupation is to carry out tasks using their socially and culturally specialized knowledge, these occupations are classified as social and cultural specialists.

All employees in the service class who have more than nine subordinates are classified as controllers even if they should be classified as social and cultural specialists. The higher-lower distinction of the service class remains the same as in the standard EGP class-schema. Hence, there are four social classes in the service class of the adjusted EGP class-schema. These are *the high-grade controllers, the high-grade social and cultural specialists, the low-grade controllers and the low-grade social and cultural specialists.*

Most occupations are simple to classify according above mentioned criteria e.g. psychologists, teachers and social workers clearly belong to the class of social and cultural specialists. However, there are some occupations that are more difficult to classify. Medical doctors are, for example, regarded as social and cultural specialists. They are relatively difficult to monitor and their tasks require socially and culturally specialised knowledge. We classified biologists, economists and architects into the class of controllers. Even though it is difficult to monitor the work tasks performed by the incumbents of these occupations, they do not have a social-cultural feature and that is why we classified them into the class of controllers. An occupation is also classified as controllers if the incumbent's *basic* task is to control the employees and to coordinate the organizational requirements like managers and administrator.

The social class structure of the standard EGP class-schema and the adjusted class schema is shown in Figure 1. The new social classes in the service class are not hierarchically ordered. They are situated next to each other with regards to their social status. The materialists and the post-materialists are also represented in these social classes. The incumbents of the *high-grade* and *low-grade controllers* are supposed to put more priority on materialistic values and the *high-grade* and *low-grade social and cultural specialists* put their priority more on post-materialistic values. Figure 1 also represents to some extent Bourdieu's (1984) division of occupation with regard to their economical and cultural dimension. This economical and cultural dimension of occupations is the same in the lower levels of occupations and it splits up in two dimensions in the higher levels, which can also be seen from Figure 1.

*[Figure 1 about here]*

We expect *the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists* to vote more for leftist parties than *the controllers* do. The tasks carried out by social and cultural specialists are on the one hand the basic needs in the society (education, health care and the like) while on the other hand it is difficult to make these tasks *more* efficient on the basis of new innovations due to mechanization and computerization (Baumol, 1967). Time dedicated to a patient by a medical doctor has been the same for a long time. This is why these occupations are economically less profitable, compared to a manager or a computer scientist. To put it in other words these occupations require more investment than they produce to keep the quality of their services up to date. This is why we expect the social and cultural specialists to vote more for left-wing political parties since these parties are proponents of a big government, and they are against privatisation of sectors where the social and cultural specialists work for e.g. education and health care.

We expect that social and cultural specialists vote more for ‘new-left’ political parties than controllers do. Members of these occupations are proponents of progressive attitudes because of their relative autonomy in their work tasks. The social and cultural specialists possess a more humanistic and value-laden knowledge, which makes its possessors more sensitive to non-economic issues. Since the ‘new-left’ political parties are proponents of democratisation, multi-cultural society and protection of environment we expect the social and cultural specialists vote more for the ‘new-left’ political parties. We also expect the controllers to vote more for right-wing political parties because these parties are defined as to preserve the *status quo* and to promote the privatisation, which are in line with the assets and strategies of controllers.

The data we use in this paper make it possible that we can test previous claims about class formation over time. Since the class structure has changed gradually, we expect that the political preferences of the social and cultural specialists have gradually crystallized as well. Our claim is that in the past decades, the social and cultural specialists became more crystallized over time, i.e. class voting has become stronger.

### **3. Data and operationalization**

To test our hypothesis, data from different surveys are used for 30 years of time (1970-2000). Nieuwebeerta and Ganzeboom (1996) combined different surveys from 1970 to 1990 and the data for the last decade stem from the Family Survey of Dutch Population in 1992 (Ultee and Ganzeboom, 1995), 1998 (De Graaf et al., 1999) and 2000 (De Graaf et al., 2002). The

Family Survey of Dutch Population 1992/1993, 1998 and 2000 are made comparable to the dataset of Nieuwebeerta and Ganzeboom (1996) and has been added to it. The resulting dataset consists of 18 different surveys over a period of 30 years and contains 32700 respondents. In Appendix A, the sources of the data are described.

*[Table 2 about here]*

Occupations of the new social classes are identified on the basis of the four digit occupational classification of the International Standard Classification of Occupations 1968 (ISCO). The recoding scheme is given in Appendix B. The criteria for splitting up the service class into four classes are given in paragraph 2.4. The service class (Ia. High-grade controllers and IIa. Low-grade controllers) of the EGP class-schema is divided into four social classes, two of them are called the new social classes (Ib. High-grade social and cultural specialists and IIb. Low-grade social and cultural specialists). The frequency distribution of the adjusted EGP class-schema is given in Table 2. This table makes clear that, besides the ‘old classes’ (Ia and IIa), the ‘new classes’ in the service class (Ib and IIb) have expanded over time<sup>4</sup>.

We analyse two different dependent variables for voting behaviour. For the first variable, the political parties are divided into two group's i.e. left-wing political parties and right-wing political parties. For the second dependent variable, the political parties are divided into three group's i.e. ‘old-left’, ‘new-left’ and right-wing political parties.

Since there is no actual voting behaviour of the respondents, we have to rely on indirect measures of voting behaviour. The voting behaviour is constructed from different variables asked in different surveys. In some surveys respondents were asked to name the party they



would vote for if there were national elections tomorrow. In other surveys, respondents were asked to name the political party they voted for in recent past or in last elections. Respondents were asked which political party they preferred or identified with in other surveys. According to Nieuwbeerta (1995, 35-36), there are no significant differences in outcomes between analysis that use only surveys that contain 'voting behaviour' measures and analysis using only surveys containing 'political preferences'. Therefore we used both voting behaviour and political preferences to construct voting behaviour. The classification of the political parties of Mackie and Rose (1991) is used to classify the political parties as leftist or rightist. In Appendix C, this classification and the frequency distribution is given. The right-wing political parties are coded as zero (0) and the left-wing political parties are coded as one (1).

We split the left-wing political parties in the Netherlands in two groups; the 'new-left' and the 'old-left'. The 'old-left' political parties are Radicals, Communist Party (CPN), Democratic Socialists 70 (DS70), Labour Party (PvdA) and the Socialist Party (SP). These parties stand up for the interests of the working class (De Graaf et al., 2001). The 'new-left' contains political parties like Democrats' 66 (D66), Green Left (Groen-Links), Radical Political Party (PPR), Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP) and the Evangelical Peoples Party (EVP). The 'new-left' political parties stress issues like more democratisation, human rights and protection of environment. All other parties are grouped as right-wing political parties<sup>5</sup>. The dependent variable 'old-left' versus 'new-left' versus right political parties is coded as 'old-left' political parties (1), 'new-left' political parties (2) and right-wing political parties (3).

To show whether the adjusted EGP class-schema improves upon the old one, we also use the standard EGP class-schema. For the simplicity of analysis, we reduce the 11 social classes of

the standard EGP schema to five and the 13 classes of the adjusted EGP schema to seven social classes<sup>6</sup>.

To examine trends of voting behaviour over *time* we construct a time variable ranging from 0 to 30 years, i.e. 1970-2000. We also examine for the interaction between *time* and *new social classes* (high-grade social and cultural specialist and the low-grade social and cultural specialists).

Education is coded as 1) primary; 2) low secondary; 3) high secondary; 4) tertiary and 5) university and post university education. The variable of the sector of employment is coded as; (0) people employed in private sector and (1) people employed in public sector (contains all organizations which are partly or totally financed by the state including education, social services, health care and foundations (stichtingen)). We used also sex (0-man, 1-woman) and age as control variables. A description of all variables is given in Appendix D.

#### **4. Analysis and results**

##### *Left-right voting behaviour*

For analysing the voting behaviour, a logistic regression analysis is applied. First, a comparison is made between the model fit of a model with the standard EGP class-schema and the fit of a model using the adjusted EGP class-schema. The improvement of the model of adjusted EGP class-schema with regard to political party preferences is presented in Table 3.

To compare the adjusted EGP class-schema with the standard EGP class-schema, *the working class* is used as reference category only in this analysis. The reason for this is that the working class takes part in both schemas and it is generally known that this class is the most leftist class.

Model B improves the model fit of Model A with 140,616 (924.089-783.473) and 2 degrees of freedom significantly. Since this is a rather strong improvement in fit, we can conclude that the adjusted EGP class-schema is a substantially better predictor of voting behaviour than the standard EGP class-schema. Our hypothesis was that there are new social classes within the service class and the adjusted EGP class-schema will predict the voting behaviour more accurate than the standard EGP class-schema. Table 3 shows that the new social classes do not vote significantly different than the working class, which indicates that the distinction made between *controllers* and *social cultural specialist* is important and that the ‘old’ *high- and low-grade controllers* vote substantially less for leftist parties. Furthermore, the rightist political orientation of *the controllers* is now more prominent.

[Table 3 about here]

Since the adjusted EGP class-schema is better to predict people’s voting behaviour than the standard EGP class-schema, we continue our analysis only with the adjusted EGP class-schema. In Table 4, the differences of class based voting between the ‘new’ social classes and the ‘old’ social classes are presented. In this table we changed the reference category into *high-grade controllers* to make comparison between the ‘old classes’ and the ‘new classes’. Model A of Table 4 shows that all social classes, except the *self-employed*, vote significantly more for left-wing political parties than the *high-grade controllers*. But the more interesting finding is that the *high-grade social and cultural specialists* are most likely to vote for left-

wing political parties and this class is substantially more left-wing than the *high-grade controllers*.

Model B shows that people working in public sector vote significantly more for left-wing political parties than people working in private sector. Including the sector of employment in the model, the differences of the ‘old classes’ and the ‘new classes’ remains. This means that the sector of employment has an independent effect on voting behaviour. Even the level of education, Model C, does not explain the differences between *the controllers* and *the social and cultural specialists*.

[Table 4 about here]

In Model D, the trend variables are included in the model. Over time (1970-2000), people became significantly more likely to vote for leftist political parties. While the *high-grade social and cultural specialists* are one of the most leftist classes, there is no trend that they come to vote more for leftist parties during the past 30 years. However, Model D shows that the *low-grade social and cultural specialists* are less leftist than the *high-grade social and cultural specialists* in 1970 but they became significantly more leftist since 1970.

After controlling for sector of employment (private versus public), level of education, age and gender in Model E, the new social classes are still significantly different than *the high-grade controllers* with regard to left versus right voting behaviour. While the *high-grade social and cultural specialists* have not changed their voting behaviour significantly, and were still one of the most leftist social classes in 1970, calculation shows that the *low-grade social and cultural specialists* have significantly changed and have become the most leftist social class in

30 years. The regression coefficient of the *low-grade social and cultural specialists* in Model E is 0.39 and if we add the trend effect of 0.6 ( $30 \times 0.02$ ) of this social class to this effect, we get a regression coefficient of 0.99 ( $0.39 + 0.6$ ). The exponent of this effect is 2.69 ( $\text{Exp}(0.99)$ ) and this is the effect of *low-grade social and cultural specialists* on voting left versus right in the year 2000, which means that, by the year 2000, the *low-grade social and cultural specialists* were the most leftist social class.

#### *New left versus right and old left versus right voting behaviour*

The left-wing political parties are split up in two streams; the ‘new-left’ and the ‘old-left’. The basic idea behind this division is that effects of ‘new classes’ are stronger for ‘new-left’ than for ‘old-left’ political parties. We used a multinomial logistic regression model. This enables us to analyse a multi-categorical dependent variable. We estimated the likelihood of a person to vote for an ‘old-left’, a ‘new-left’ or a right-wing political party. Analysing the dependent variable of voting behaviour, we take the right-wing political parties as the *baseline category* (Lammers, Pelzer and Hendricks, 1996). The results are presented in Table 5.

Model A of Table 5 shows that the ‘new classes’ within the service class vote significantly different than the *high-grade controllers*. While the odds of voting for ‘old-left’ political parties is highest for the *working class*, the *high-grade social and cultural specialists* are 2.16 ( $\text{Exp}(0.77)$ ) times more likely to vote for ‘old-left’ political parties than the *high-grade controllers*. The ‘new classes’, the *high-* and *low-grade social and cultural specialists*, are most likely to vote for ‘new-left’ political parties, respectively 2.63 ( $\text{Exp}(1)$ ) and 2.02 ( $\text{Exp}(0.7)$ ) times more than the *high-grade controllers*. Interestingly, while all social classes, except the self-employed, are more likely to vote for ‘old-wing’ political parties than the high-grade controllers, only the *high-* and *low-grade social and cultural specialists* vote

significantly more for ‘new-left’ political parties than *the high-grade controllers*. The working class votes even more for right-wing parties than *the high-grade controllers* while they are the most likely to vote for ‘old-left’ political parties. These results are in accordance with our expectations.

The sector of employment has a significant effect on both voting for ‘old-left’ political parties as well as on ‘new-left’ political parties. Model B shows that people working in public sector vote significantly more for ‘old-left’ as well as for ‘new-left’ political parties. Model B shows once more that the sector of employment is not an explanation for the differences between ‘old classes’ and the ‘new classes’. Even the level of education, in Model C, does not explain the differences between the ‘old classes’ and the ‘new classes’.

Including time and trend (interaction) variables in the Model D shows that people became significantly less likely to vote for ‘old-left’ political parties over time while the likelihood of voting for ‘new-left’ political parties increases significantly. *The high-grade social and cultural specialists* do not differ from *the high-grade controllers* with regard to vote for ‘old-left’ political parties in 1970. While there is no significantly trend for *the high-grade social and cultural specialists*, there is a significantly trend for *the low-grade social and cultural specialists* with regard to vote for ‘old-left’ and ‘new-left’ political parties.

In Model E of Table 5, all variables are included in the model, which improves the model fit significantly. In Model E, *the high-grade social and cultural specialists* are most likely to vote for ‘new-left’ political parties. If we add the trend effect of 0.6 ( $30 \times 0.02$ ) of 30 years of *the low-grade social cultural specialists* to the regression coefficient of 0.87 ( $0.27 + 0.6$ ) of this class, we see that the exponent of this figure is the highest 2.37 ( $\text{Exp}(0.87)$ ) of all social

classes. Over time, *the low-grade social and cultural specialists* came to vote also more for ‘old-left’ parties and at the end of 30 years (in 2000) they were the most leftist social class, i.e. an exponent of 2.53 ( $\text{Exp}(0.93)$ ) ( $30 \cdot 0.2 = 0.6 + 0.33 = 0.93$ ). This means that, between 1970 and 2000, *the low-grade social and cultural specialists* have formed themselves as the most leftist social class. Results also suggests that the old service class is by far the most conservative social class in the post-industrial Netherlands.

*[Table 5 about here]*

## **5. Conclusion and discussion**

In this paper, we discussed the ‘new class’ theories in order to adjust the EGP class-schema. Investigations (Asselberghs et al., 1998; Ganzeboom and Luijkx, forthcoming) show that the occupational structure and the social class structure in the Netherlands has changed and the Dutch employment structure has transformed into a post-industrial one. Since the EGP class-schema is classified on grounds of employment relations and occupations of industrial societies, a revision of this class structure was needed. Inspired by ‘new class’ theories we have adjusted the EGP class-schema on grounds of these occupational changes. Due to occupational changes, the service class (the high-grade professionals and the low-grade professionals) of the EGP class-schema expanded enormously. We thus distinguished two ‘new classes’ (the high-grade social and cultural specialists and the low-grade social and cultural specialists) within the service class on the basis of employment relations. The employment relations of the ‘new classes’ is culturally and socially specialized knowledge

and therefore difficult to monitor by employers whilst the ‘old classes’ in the service class seek to preserve the viability of their employed organization and are easier to monitor.

Using data from various Dutch surveys gathered between 1970 and 2000, we compared our adjusted EGP class-schema with the standard EGP class-schema with regard to voting behaviour. Our results show that the adjusted EGP class-schema is significantly more able to explain people’s political orientation.

Goldthorpe (1982, 1995) claims that the service class is in formation and if it will consolidate, managers and professionals will become more and more similar to each other. He also claims that these classes are an ‘essentially conservative element within the society’. Our data show that there are substantial social cleavages within the service class. The ‘new classes’ have significantly more leftist political orientation than the ‘old classes’. The high-grade social and cultural specialists are significantly different in their political orientations than the high-grade controllers; this has been so since 1970. The low-grade social and cultural specialists were initially less leftist oriented, but by the year 2000 they were as leftist as the high-grade social and cultural specialists were. This means that the *consolidation process* of the service class is working in the opposite direction to what Goldthorpe expects. The social cleavages within the service class are salient. Apparently, the consolidation process is parallel to the transformation process from industrial to post-industrial society. Thus, we conclude that the distinguished ‘new classes’ become more effective to explain people’s political orientations over time. We are aware that our findings are based on the Dutch political and occupational structure. Future research should reveal whether our conclusions apply to other countries as well.



Most of the social and cultural specialists are employed in the private sector in the Netherlands. It is generally known that people employed in the public sector vote more for left-wing political parties because these parties invest more in the public sector. Our results also show that people employed in the public sector vote significantly more for left-wing political parties. But even after controlling for sector of employment the 'new classes' still vote significantly more for left-wing political parties than the 'old classes'. This means that the differences in voting behaviour between 'old classes' and 'new classes' are not caused by the sector of employment. Subsequently, social class is still an important determinant of people's political orientation.

According to Brint (1984) and Goldthorpe (1995), the differences between the managers and the social and cultural specialists with regard to lifestyles and behaviour are caused by their educational differences. However the level of education does not explain the differences between the 'old classes' and the 'new classes'. It can be the case that the type of education can explain the differences that we find. But, according to Van der Werfhorst and De Graaf (forthcoming), the effect of social classes on political orientation remains even after controlling for the type of education.

It is clear that the construct validity of the adjusted EGP class-schema cannot sufficiently be tested by only one kind of behaviour, i.e. the voting behaviour. It is therefore relevant to examine to what extent the adjusted EGP class-schema can explain the variance of different kind of lifestyle forms, attitudes and behaviour and whether the adjusted EGP class-schema becomes more relevant due to the class formation process. We hope to do this in the near future.

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## Notes

1) This index represents the differences between the percentage of manual workers voting for leftist political parties and the percentage nonmanual workers voting for leftist political parties. It is a poor measure since it takes just two social classes in consideration.

2) New social movements consist of the ecology movement, the peace movement, the anti-nuclear movement, the women's movement and the squatter's movement.

3) In his earlier work, Goldthorpe (1979, 1980, and 1987) distinguished the social classes according to similar market and work situations of the incumbents of social classes. Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992, 37) also mention this in footnote 9.

4) Only men are used in Table 2 because in the surveys until 1981 only the occupations of the heads of the households is asked, if the respondent was a woman. To see whether the results of men and women are different we analysed men and women apart. Although, the results were not different for men while it was different for women. Because, inclusion of women in the analysis does not change the overall results, we decide to include women in our further analysis. The class structure for women is an other study, which is out the scope of this paper.

5) Of course, for the Netherlands, there exist detailed left-right scores for political parties. However, using scales based on these scores will hardly result in different results. Our division in three categories can be regarded as a rather conservative test.

6) Our reduced EGP schema consists of: 1) High-grade controllers (I); 2) Low-grade controllers (II); 3) Routine non-manuals (IIIa), (IIIb); 4) Self-employed (IVa), (IVb), (IVc); 5) Working class (V), (VI), (VIIa), (VIIb). Our reduced adjusted EGP schema consists of: 1) High-grade controllers (Ia); 2) High-grade social and cultural specialists (Ib); 3) Low-grade controllers (IIa); 4) Low-grade social and cultural specialists (IIb); 5) Routine non-manuals (IIIa), (IIIb); 6) Self-employed (IVa), (IVb), (IVc); 7) Working class (V), (VI), (VIIa), (VIIb). For further clarification see Figure 1.

