政治学理論（政治経済）

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2010年度冬学期　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 hiwatari@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp 月曜３限

本講は広範な政治学の中でも、政治経済とよばれる分野の体系的・包括的理解を突破口に政治学全般への案内を目的とする。現在の各国の政治経済の特徴は、政治と経済、政策決定の国際要因と国内要因が交錯することにある。戦後の先進国政治経済は通常「埋め込まれた自由主義」と称される。その特徴は、民主政治の枠内で国内政策による経済発展と社会安定とが確保され、そのような国内の発展と安定に立脚して国家間合意による自由で開放的な貿易・資本移動の体制が発展してきたことにある。特に、７０年代半ば以降、先進諸国の埋め込まれた自由主義は、主要国の変動通貨と資本自由化、経済の低成長、社会の高齢化への移行を契機に、国内政策への国際市場の規律・制約が強化されるかたちで変容してきている。このような国際開放的な民主政体・市場経済は、９０年代以降、社会主義経済崩壊の結果、規範化され、地球大に普及し、更には、数年前からの世界不況により挑戦を受けている。それにも拘らず、以上のような動きの結果、各国の政治と経済、国際政治経済と国内政治経済の連動関係は、一層強化されたと言えよう。

そこで、本講では、政治経済分析の理論的展開と最新の実証分析を講義・解説する。そのことを通して、（１）戦後の先進国の政治経済の特徴を、基軸のアメリカ自由市場政治経済からの「偏差」として把握し、（２）貿易や投資の拡大が国内にどのような政策反応を惹起し、それが貿易・投資や通貨・金融やめぐる、発展途上国を含めた国際的・地域的協力関係をどう変容・展開させたかを理解し、（３）特に、近年の資本移動及び貿易拡大が先進諸国政府にどのような金融・財政政策や構造改革・社会福祉改革の要請を新たにもたらしているかを検証し、最後に（４）先進諸国の対外経済政策、特に経済援助政策が発展途上国での市場経済や民主政体の世界的拡大に伴ってどのように変化しかを検討する。以上を通して、理論的には、研究分野としての従来の峻別が無意味化している国際政治経済と比較（国内）政治経済の積極的統合、政治経済の先端的理論および実証研究動向の把握、更に特異な日本の事例―日本の国内政治や国際関係分析―への含意発掘の３点をめざす。

本講の進め方は講義を主体とする。参加者はシラバスの番号がついている指定文献を読んでいることが期待される。毎週、シラバスの文献の内容を確認し、もしくは補足説明をしながら、最近にいたる議論の学説的背景や問題関心の展開、実証的結果を紹介する。教室では、お互い教材やその含意・意義に関する疑問点や問題点を、自由に討論することで積極的に参加することが奨励される。以上のことを通して、最低限、身辺の政治経済状況をより知的、的確、体系的に理解するのに必要な分析視点や素養を習得し、更には、一層の政治経済という政治学分野の面白さや可能性を触発されたり、本講で扱えない政治分析への関心を惹起されたりすることが、本講の成功の規準となろう。教材はe-journal でダウンロードできるが、入手が難しいものは、当方でマスターコピーを用意する。

単位認定は (1) 毎回のゼミ出席と(2) テークホーム試験による。尚、相談のある人はメールでアポイントメントをとっていただきたい。（このシラバスと昨年度の講義資料スライドは <http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~hiwatari/> からもダウンロードできるようにする。）

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**V.　経済援助と経済制裁の政治経済**

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